Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy [Arthur Ripstein] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. In this masterful work, both an. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, Harvard UP, , pp., $ (hbk), ISBN Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is a major accomplishment; there is something to be learned from virtually every page. Ripstein’s goal is to reconstruct and.

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He argues in effect that a rightful international organization of states can never be more than what Kant calls a ‘congress’ MS 6: Ripstein argues, for instance, that when the poor are supported through any form of charity, however benevolently intended, this puts them in essentially the same position they would be in if they were slaves.

Karl Olivecrona’s Legal Philosophy. In addition to providing a clear and coherent statement of the most misunderstood of Kant’s ideas, Ripstein also shows that Kant’s views remain conceptually powerful and morally appealing today.

Kantian external freedom is not a matter of advantage, welfare or other “material” considerations, and the innate equality it involves is not a matter of an equal distribution of any benefit. Chapter 5, on contract and consent, continues its emphasis on the purely formal character of the rights involved, which are therefore not based on such material considerations as mutual advantage. Sign in Create an account. Ripstein argues for the Kantian thesis that rightfully sharing purposes with others is not possible merely through adding one person’s volition to another’s, but requires a “joining of wills” through mutual acts, each of which takes the other’s volitional act as an object p.

Force and Freedom

The essays offer readings and elucidations of Ripstein’s thought, dispute some of his claims and extend some of his themes within broader philosophical contexts, thus developing the significance of Ripstein’s ideas for contemporary legal and political philosophy.

Ripstein postpones to an Appendix his consideration of this very basic but also very difficult question. As Skinner has argued in his ri;stein book, Hobbes and Republican Libertyit was opposed by Hobbes. Sign in to use this feature.

Freedom and Force

Mills – – Res Philosophica 95 1: So our conversation, which consisted mainly of youth listening to the superior frerdom of age, centered on the current state of Kant scholarship. Request removal from index.

He therefore emphasizes Kant’s rejection of private or religious charity, and his insistence that the poor should be provided for through taxation of the rich pp. Neither Justice nor Charity?


The innate right to freedom over your own body must be “extended” to things outside you. In Chapter 9, Ripstein argues at length rreedom the Kantian state has wide powers and responsibilities when it comes to economic control and redistribution.

Choice, Ripstein forcf out, for Kant as for Aristotle, is distinguished from mere wish by the fact that you take yourself to have the means available to pursue your end p. A Permissive Theory of Territorial Rights.

Arthur Ripstein University of Toronto, St. Kant may not approve the revolutionary overthrow of a legal order, but he may regard as permissible or even obligatory the creation of a condition of right out of one he would call ‘barbarism’ — organized coercion without law. He contrasts this with a libertarian model, according to which a state is the creation of ripsttein persons empowered, essentially as only another private person, to do what they have set it up to do.

Chapter 11 discusses Kant’s notorious rejection of the right of revolution.

Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy – PhilPapers

Ripstein supplements this interpretation chiefly by arguing on Kantian formal grounds that punishment must be drawn from the nature of the criminal’s act rather than from consequentialist or deterrence considerationsclaiming that this underwrites Kant’s insistence on the Ius Talionis. It emphasizes the interpersonal character of Kant’s neo- republican concept of freedom, and also the equality built into it as purely formal, in contrast to approaches that treat “equal” freedom as equal distribution of some benefit p.

But if the principle of right involves an “extension” of the categorical imperative, and is not a “derivation” from it, how can it also “follow” from it? Chapter 10 takes up the state’s right to punish crime, and Ripstein’s position broadly follows that of Sharon Byrd, who emphasizes the state’s right coercively to prevent wrong, and sees Kant’s well-known retributivism as conditioned by this aim.

Uleman – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 3: Chapters 7 and 8 emphasize the public and universal function of the law, and the fact that a condition of right requires certain forms of mandatory co-operation that could not, from a Kantian standpoint, be justified on any grounds of welfare or private benefit.

Here he focuses mainly on issues of the parental responsibilities for children, and avoids taking up the other applications Kant makes of this category, which most of us today would regard as indefensible, or at best only partly defensible. Since then I have read many good books on Kant’s legal and political philosophy, many by people I know and respect one of them even based on a doctoral dissertation I supervised. The innate right to freedom needs to be extended, as Kant argues, to means outside your body through the right of property over things, and rights relating to other persons — of contract and of status — which comprehend the sphere of “private right”.


But I’m sorry that Gadamer, though he lived to the age ofstill did not live long enough to read it.


Thus the principle of right “provides a license to consider things in space irpstein time under laws of freedom” p. Kant may redescribe many cases in which his position is thought indefensible. Instead, he begins by noting Kant’s sharp distinction between right and ethics, and proceeds from the Kantian concept of right or external freedom: Readings in the Philosophy of Law. Nevertheless Ripstein does ably expound Kant’s theory of right in the way anv ought to be expounded, and he gives thoughtful discussion of a wide range of issues from the authentically Kantian perspective on right and politics.

A Reply Arthur Ripstein. Basic to this concept of freedom is being “your own master” sui jurisin contrast to being like a slave or serf subordinated to the will of another. Edmundson – – Ethics 4: This chapter also treats Kant’s discussion of the way in which one can own, not another person, but the other person’s ripstsin as spouse, child or servant. He then cites Kant’s claim that the principle of right enters “as a postulate that is incapable of further proof” MS 6: And if the principle of right is such an “extension” why doesn’t Kant present it this way — ripsteni first stating the Categorical imperative and then explicitly introducing the concept of right as an “extension” of it?

Harvard University Press Kate Moran – – Canadian Journal of Ripstei 47 4: Science Logic and Mathematics. Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy.

Persons and Bodies Japa Pallikkathayil 3. Realism in Normative Political Theory.